Back in 1989 while on Tactical Patrol in the Pacific Ocean, serving on board a United States Navy Warship, I was standing duty or watch as we call it in the Navy, as Officer of the Deck.  One of my Lookouts spotted a large purple ball floating in mid air.  It was the size of a 737 plane.  Our ship was equipped with a surface search radar and an air search radar and we began to track it.  The Sailor called the object to my attention, and with amazement, I just stared at this thing.  Then all of the sudden this purple ball bounced around the sky at incredible speeds.  My air search radar operator called me on the ship's intercom system from our Combat Information Center or CIC.  CIC tracked the mysterious object at over 4,000 miles per hour.  I called the Captain of the Ship to come out and take a look at it.  The Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, and a host of other Sailors and Marines, saw this object move across the sky at incredible speeds.  We logged the object in he ships Deck Log as a UFO.  And never spoke of it again until now. 

By  Wayne Taylor

ABSTRACT

Rules of Engagement

A Problem in Tactical Judgment for the Commanding Officer of the USS Vincennes CG 49

This paper reports on the findings of research conducted to investigate if there was a problem in the tactical judgment of the Commanding Officer of a United States Navy Warship, after a decision was made to engage an alleged inbound hostile fighter aircraft.  The aircraft was later found to be a civilian passenger airliner.  Four questions relating to the issues are addressed. The first question discusses the actions taken based on specified elements of recorded electronic profile data. The second question discusses the actions taken based on the lack of communication by the aircraft. The third question discusses if the decision to fire on the target was based on tragic events of 1986 and 1987 that influenced the exteriority in which United States Naval units operated in the Persian Gulf.  The final question discusses if correct procedures where followed based on a governing doctrine of instructions.  Research sources include military publications, periodicals, technical reference manuals, and personal experiences and qualifications in the area of Surface Warfare. Research methodology includes historical data collection, data analysis, and analysis of standard procedures. Report concludes with a recommendation of exoneration or persecution of the choice of action by the Commanding Officer based on presented information.

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